Showing posts with label Free Speech. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Free Speech. Show all posts

Friday, October 27, 2023

Free Speech 6: Cyberbullying

In 2019, a U.S. District Court in the Eighth Circuit ruled on a case in which a student had been suspended from school for violating the school district’s cyberbullying policy. See A.S. v. Lincoln Cty. R-III Sch. Dist., 429 F. Supp. 3d 659, 669-70 (E.D. Mo. 2019).

In that case, a high school student, A.S., a student who had been bullying C.S., a classmate with depression, created a social media post containing a doctored photograph of C.S., lying in a casket with text referring to C.S.’s funeral and visitation at a funeral home. A.S. shared this with a group of other students and encouraged them to post it on their own social media pages - which they did. The next Monday during class, C.S., upset about another student’s comments about his “death,” put the student in a chokehold. After investigating the incident, the school principal suspended A.S. for ten days for violating the school district's cyberbullying policy. A.S. appealed his suspension.

In its decision, the Court noted that although students don't “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)), the First Amendment does not protect all speech in the school environment, and school officials may lawfully punish some forms of unprotected student speech (citing S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, stating: “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts class, involves substantial disorder, or invades the rights of others is . . . “not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”).

The Court further noted that Tinker applies to off-campus student speech where it is "reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial disruption to the educational setting” (citing S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 777 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)). On this basis, speech that “actually causes” a substantial disruption to the educational environment is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 778.

In deciding the case, the Court concluded that although A.S.’s social media post was created off school grounds, it was purposefully designed to bully and harass another student by generating talk among other students at the high school at A.S.'s invitation and encouragement. Not only had it caused an actual disruption at the school, it was reasonably foreseeable to school administrators that, if left unchecked, the disruption would continue given the effect it already had on C.S., as well as the students who expressed concern for him to teachers and administrators, but also on the students who continued to tease and make comments to C.S. about his death. On this basis, the Court held that A.J.’s off-campus speech was not protected by the First Amendment and that the school district was within its authority to discipline A.S. for his speech.

Thursday, October 26, 2023

Free Speech 5: Restrictions on Student Speech on School Grounds

Adam Henerey was a high school student who decided to run for junior class president. Like all the other students seeking to run for student council office, he was required to sign a contract requiring all candidates to agree to obey all school rules, including the requirement that before distribution, all campaign materials had to be approved by the principal or assistant principal.

When the campaign began, Henerey obtained approval from the administration for his campaign slogan, “Adam Henerey, The Safe Choice.” Henerey became aware that as in previous years, the other candidates were handing out gum and candy. On the day of the election, in the school hallways, Henerey handed out condoms with stickers bearing his campaign slogan. Unfortunately, he hadn’t first obtained approval from the administration before he distributed the condoms.

While the ballots were being counted, a student complained to the school principal about Henery handing out condoms. The principal decided that Henerey should be disqualified from the student election for his failure to comply with the rule requiring students to get prior approval before distributing materials. Although Henerey received the majority of the ballots cast in the election, he was not allowed to take office. Henery appealed this decision.

When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case, it explained that although students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)), the Constitution does not compel “teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students” (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)). See Henerey ex rel. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999).  It further explained that the constitutional rights of public school students "are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings and a school need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its pedagogical mission, even though the government could not suppress that speech outside of the schoolhouse. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, (1988) (citing Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685). Id. It concluded that courts must analyze First Amendment violations alleged by students “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment” (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 at 506). Id. 

The Court upheld the school’s policy, finding that school officials may restrict individual student expression that “is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” carries an implied imprimatur of the school, “would substantially interfere with the work of the school, or impinge upon the rights of other students.”


Free Speech 4: Speech Advocating Illegal Conduct

Question:  Does the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protect a public school student from the consequences of wearing a t-shirt featuring an illegal drug or underage drinking to public school or a school-sponsored event?

Answer:  No.

In Morse v. Frederick, a student appealed his school suspension, claiming that his high school had violated his First Amendment right to freedom of expression. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).

In that case, a school district sponsored an event during school hours at which students and staff could stand in front of the high school, on either side of the street, to watch the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed by the school on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the appointed time, students and teachers left their classes and assembled on either side of the street in front of the school. Once outside, teachers and administrators monitored the students' actions.

Frederick, a high school senior, and his friends chose to stand on the side of the street across from the school. As the torchbearers and camera crews approached, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” The large banner was easily read by the students on the other side of the street. The school principal crossed the street and directed the students to take down the banner because the banner appeared to advocate illegal drug use in violation of school policy. All but Frederick complied. The banner was confiscated and he was subsequently suspended from school.

On review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the school officials did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the banner and suspending Frederick. The Court concluded that the “substantial disruption” rule of Tinker was not the only basis for restricting student speech. Considering the special characteristics of the school environment and the government’s interest in preventing student drug abuse, the Court decided that the school was entitled to take steps to safeguard the students entrusted to their care from speech that could reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. Based on this reasoning, courts have given public schools a fair amount of leeway in deciding whether student expression poses a danger to their other students or staff.