Showing posts with label Eighth Circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eighth Circuit. Show all posts

Friday, October 27, 2023

Free Speech 7: Dress Codes

Although public schools must respect students’ constitutional right to freedom of expression, the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have determined that schools may place certain limits on students' free speech in the school setting. This includes limits on the clothing that students can wear to school. For example, First Amendment free speech may not protect a student who wears items with words, images, or symbols that:

• are vulgar or lewd. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  

• threaten violence. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U. S. 723, 733 (2015).

• promote illegal conduct. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

• are likely to cause serious disruption at school or violate other students’ rights. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 735 (8th Cir. 2009).

However, it appears that public school students in the states covered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota), are unlikely to receive governmental interference with their hairstyles. 

In Torvik v. Decorah Community School District, two male students appealed a school district regulation requiring all male school students to conform their hairstyle to certain approved standards. See Torvik v. Decorah Cmty. Sch., 453 F.2d 779, 779 (8th Cir. 1972). Finding that the regulation violated the student’s right to free expression, the Eighth Circuit wrote:

    “A regulation governing the hairstyle of students cannot be sustained simply because it is promulgated by school authorities. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cmty School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). This approach would otherwise condone the prohibiting of any recognized constitutional right. Every individual enjoys the liberty to wear the hairstyle he chooses. Before the state can intrude into recognized areas of privacy and freedom there must exist some rational basis to justify paternal control. This court recently found that no rational relation exists between a similar school regulation and the educational goals and processes of school administration.” 

Monday, October 2, 2023

The Long and Winding to School-Supported Private School Placement

I receive a number of calls from parents of children with IEPs asking how they can require their child’s school district to pay the tuition and related costs for their child's placement in an out–of–state private school. 


I explain that unless a school district agrees to the placement and to payment of the tuition and fees, a parent will have a long, tough road ahead. An example of this complex terrain is demonstrated by the following abbreviated history of the Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District case.  


Background:

The Steckelberg's son, AMS, was a special education student in a South Dakota public school high school. He had several diagnoses, including autoimmune disorder, PANS/PANDA, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Tourette's Syndrome, and random tic disorders. His symptoms prevented him from sitting still in the classroom, paying attention to his teachers, and learning the information being taught. It was difficult for AMS to control his challenging behaviors which included shouting, swearing, not following rules, cheating, and sexual behaviors. 


2018:  

  • In February, a behavior analyst hired by the school district who had performed a Functional Behavior Assessment of AMS, developed and gave to the school district a behavior support plan. However, it was never shared with AMS's parents, teachers, or the IEP team, and was never implemented.
  • In the summer, before AMS started his junior year, he had a sexually related incident with a six-year-old girl that resulted in criminal charges.
  • On December 14, the principal sent an email to the parents stating, "I'm at the point where I don't think being at Chamberlain High School is the right setting for [AMS]." 

2019: 

  • The IEP team met on January 25 with the parents in attendance. During the meeting, the parents agreed to home placement of AMS, believing that AMS would receive behavioral and educational supports and services at home. However, the School District did not provide those supports and services, and the home placement was a disaster.
  • In April, the parents gave to the School District information about some possible out-of-state placements for AMS that they had located. Their list included the Kaizen Academy, a residential treatment facility in Utah. The School District contacted Kaizen to see if AMS might be a fit for that facility. The District didn't pursue the placement when it learned that Medicaid would not pay any portion of the costs associated with AMS's attendance at Kaizen.
  • On August 26, although neither Medicaid nor the School District was willing to pay any portion of the costs for educational and therapeutic services, room, board, or transportation, the parents enrolled AMS at Kaizen Academy.
  • On August 30, the parents filed a due process complaint with the South Dakota Department of Education, alleging that the school district had denied AMS a FAPE and that his placement at the Kaizen Academy for therapy and education should be paid for by the School District under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education.*
2021: 

  • On July 8, the hearing officer ruled on the parents' due process complaint, likening AMS's circumstances to those of the special education student in S.B. v. Murfreesboro City Sch., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31675, 2016 WL 927441 (M.D. Tenn. March 11, 2016), in which the district court found that the student's educational difficulties could not be separated from his emotional and behavioral problems, and that the residential placement was needed for the student to benefit from special education. The hearing officer in the Steckelberg parents' due process case ruled that the School District failed to offer AMS a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), that the private placement at Kaizen Academy was proper, and that the School District was responsible for reimbursing the parents for AMS's private tuition and travel expenses. 
  • On August 6, the School District appealed the hearing officer's decision to the South Dakota State District Court. 
  • On August 23, the parents filed a motion to remove the case from state court to the US District Court for the Southern District of South Dakota.

2022:  

  • On January 18, the US District Court for the Southern District of South Dakota found in favor of the parents' request for the case to be removed from state to federal court. Steckelberg v. Chamberlain Sch. Dist., No. 4:21-CV-4147-LLP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10294 (D.S.D. Jan. 18, 2022).
  • On the same day, it affirmed the hearing officer's due process decision. Steckelberg v. Chamberlain Sch. Dist., 77 F.4th 1167 (8th Cir. 2023).
  • AMS graduated from high school at Kaisen Academy.

2023:  

  • The School District appealed the federal district court decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
  • On August 15, the Eighth Circuit issued a decision upholding the due process hearing decision and the federal district court ruling that both found that the School District failed to provide AMS with a FAPE and awarded reimbursement to the parents of his private school tuition and related costs. See Steckelberg v. Chamberlain Sch. Dist., 77 F.4th 1167 (8th Cir. 2023).
*The IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)) bars private school tuition reimbursement when a school district makes a free appropriate public education (FAPE) available by correctly identifying a child as having a disability and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child's needs. Additionally, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) covers the circumstances under which the amount of reimbursement for private school tuition described in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) may be reduced or denied by a public educational entity, such as when a parent fails to give 10 days' notice before removing a child from public school or refuses to make a child available for evaluation, and § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) lists circumstances in which a parent's failure to give notice may or must be excused. 



Education Malpractice?

  [I wrote most of this blog last spring, but held off completing it until after the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Baker v. Bentonsville.]

Last spring I had a flood of calls from Iowa parents asking if they could sue a school district, area education agency, or an employee of either for “education malpractice.” The short answer is probably not because the courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for education malpractice. 

Malpractice is a tort (a civil wrong) based on reasonableness and fault. Under tort law, an individual who has suffered because of the improper conduct of another person or entity may sue for money damages. The purpose of tort law is to balance a plaintiff's claim to protection from harm against the defendant's freedom of action. Malpractice focuses on the duty owed to the recipient of the professional service and whether that duty has been breached, causing injury. See DeMitchell, T., King, S., & DeMitchell, TA. 2022. Educational Malpractice: Is it a tort whose time has come? 32 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 253, 262.

Educational malpractice complaints are generally brought under the theory of negligence and focus on the reasonableness of the conduct of school officials in providing the basic functions of teaching, supervising, placing, and testing students in relation to academic performance.  

Between 1982 and 2023, Iowa’s state and federal courts and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have issued 66 decisions involving educational malpractice claims. I have briefly summarized four of them below. 

1986 Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 113-15 (Iowa 1986). 

In the Moore decision, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa recognized three categories of educational malpractice. 

  1. Basic academic instruction or misrepresentation of the level of academic performance,
  2. Placing or failing to place a student in a specific educational setting, 
  3. Supervision of student performance. 

In denying relief to the plaintiffs, the court gave five policy reasons for its refusal to make any of these categories actionable:

  1. the absence of an adequate standard of care, 
  2. uncertainty in determining damages,
  3. the burden placed on schools by the potential flood of litigation that would probably result, 
  4. the deference given to the educational system to carry out its internal operations, and 
  5. the general reluctance of courts to interfere in an area regulated by legislative standards.

The court also posited that educational malpractice claims "would force the courts blatantly to interfere with the internal operations and daily workings of an educational institution" which would be contrary to academic freedom and the autonomy of schools. 

2001 Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Iowa 2001). 

In Sain, the Iowa Supreme Court dismissed the educational malpractice claims of a former Cedar Rapids Community School District student who was being recruited to play Division I college basketball. He filed suit against the District after losing his scholarship to play basketball for a major college when it turned out that one of the courses he took on the advice of his high school guidance counselor had not been accepted by the NCAA Clearinghouse. The student filed an action claiming that the guidance counselor breached a duty to provide competent academic advice concerning the student’s eligibility to participate in Division I sports as a freshman. In finding against the student, the court held that the school district had no duty to provide a list of courses for approval to the NCAA.

2020 Richardson v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 957 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2020)

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief to the parents of a child with disabilities who claimed that the school had engaged in educational malpractice in violation of the ADA and § 504 when it failed to ensure that their child was not bullied. In finding against the parents, the court stated that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165, do not create general tort liability for educational malpractice. 

The court explained that when alleged ADA and § 504 violations are based on educational services for disabled children, the plaintiff must prove that school officials acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment," and further explained:

In order to establish bad faith or gross misjudgment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct departed substantially from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards so as to demonstrate that the persons responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. Bad faith or gross misjudgment requires more than "mere non-compliance with the applicable federal statutes." The non-compliance "must deviate so substantially from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards   as to demonstrate that the defendant acted with wrongful intent." 

2023 Baker v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 75 F.4th 810, 815-16 (8th Cir. 2023)

A young child with impaired visual acuity had several playground accidents (i.e., tripping on a concrete slab, colliding with the foot of a child playing on the monkey bars, etc.). The school implemented a § 504 Plan with safety provisions and no further accidents occurred.  A year later, after the child was diagnosed with epilepsy, her parents filed a lawsuit against the school district claiming the district had committed educational malpractice in violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  

As in the case above the Eighth Circuit said that neither the ADA nor § 504 create general tort liability for educational malpractice and further stated that in the context of children with disabilities, either bad faith or gross misjudgment must be demonstrated before there is a viable claim for a § 504 violation. Explaining that bad faith or gross misjudgment requires more than mere non-compliance with a rule; the non-compliance must deviate so substantially as to demonstrate that the defendant acted with wrongful intent. It concluded, “This rule reflects a proper balance between the rights of handicapped children, the responsibilities of state educational officials, and the competence of courts to make judgments in technical fields.”


Tuesday, September 20, 2022

Doe v. Aberdeen School District, 42 F.4th 883 (8th Cir. 2022)

When Does Restraint and Seclusion Violate a Child’s Fourth Amendment Rights? 

When May a SPED Parent File a Federal Court Complaint Without First Exhausting Administrative Remedies under the IDEA?

   In 2018, parents of children in special education filed a complaint in federal district court against a school district, special education teacher, and other school staff, in which they claimed, among other things, that when the special education teacher restrained and secluded their children, she violated their  rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    The defendants moved the court to dispose of the case on the basis that they were protected by qualified immunity against the parents’ claims, and because the parents hadn’t first exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA. 

    On September 20, 2021, the federal district court issued its decision granting, denying, and dismissing over forty of the parties' motions and claims, in which it ruled that the parents weren’t required to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA because the most serious parts of their complaint were focused on the abuse their children suffered at school - not on denial of a free appropriate public education under the IDEA. The decision was appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

   On August 1, 2022, the Eighth Circuit issued its decision. Although it rejected the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claims, noting that the children did not have records of behaviors that placed them or others in imminent danger of serious physical harm, the court held that the special education teacher committed Fourth Amendment violations when she:

    1.  secluded a child in "the little room,"

    2.     secluded a second child with barriers in a "calm-down corner,"

    3.    forcibly held down a third child, stripped off his clothes, put  him in a bathing suit; and

    4.    grabbed the same child by his arms, pushed him into a swimming pool, and wouldn’t let him get out.

The court further held teacher wasn’t entitled to qualified immunity on these Fourth Amendment claims because she had violated the students’ clearly established federal rights when she:

    1.  curtailed the students' movement severely enough to implicate the Fourth Amendment;

    2.  substantially departed from accepted standards such that she unreasonably seized the students in contravention of their Fourth Amendment rights;

    3.  substantially departed from accepted principles when restraining and secluding the students, she violated clearly established federal rights.

    Citing its decisions holding that an authorized professional's treatment of a student with disabilities is reasonable if the professional’s actions are “not a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,” the court found that the standards in this case were "clear cut," and quoted the May 2012 U.S. Department of Education Guidance stating: “Physical restraint or seclusion should not be used except in situations where the child's behavior poses an imminent danger of serious physical harm to self or others and other interventions are ineffective and should be discontinued as soon as imminent danger of serious physical harm to self or others has dissipated. . . . Restraint or seclusion should never be used as punishment or discipline] . . . as a means of coercion or retaliation, or as a convenience.”

 

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Tuition Reimbursement is Not Automatically Barred When Placement is a School that Primaily Serves Students with Disabilities

As an attorney practicing in Iowa, I take particular note of the special education opinions issued by the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has appellate jurisdiction over the federal district courts of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Only the U.S. Supreme Court has greater authority than the Eighth Circuit to interpret the law that must be followed by those courts.

Last year, the Eighth Circuit decided a case that may be important to some parents of children with disabilities who are living in within its jurisdiction. In C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 (636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. Minn. 2011), the Court reviewed a matter in which parents who believed a school district had violated their child’s right to a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) over a two year period, had placed their child in a private school, and requested that the school district reimburse them for the tuition expenses. In countering the parents’ request, the school district contended that among the reasons it had no duty to reimburse C.B.’s tuition was that his placement in a private school that primarily served students with disabilities did not accord with the IDEA’s least restrictive environment provision.

For the first time, in C.B., the Eighth Circuit joined the Third and Sixth Circuits in holding that a child’s placement in a school that primarily serves students with disabilities does not need to satisfy the IDEA’s preference that children with disabilities be educated in the least-restrictive environment. In finding that the placement was proper, the Court ordered the school district to reimburse the parents for the cost of C.B.’s tuition on the basis that: (1) the record in the case supported the conclusion that C.B.’s individualized education program (IEP) was not reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit because year after year the district had failed to help C.B. achieve even trifling goals, and (2) the IDEA’s preference for mainstreaming does not automatically make placement in a private school that primarily educates children with disabilities an inappropriate private placement under the circumstances in C.B.’s case.

This decision doesn’t mean that parents who think their child isn't receiving a FAPE can enroll their child in a private school and assume that the school district will be required to pay the child’s tuition. However, it does set a precedent for the courts in the Eighth Circuit, which provides that in the Eighth Circuit, the IDEA’s “least restrictive environment” preference does not bar a court from ordering a school district to reimburse tuition on the basis that a private school is one that primarily serves students with disabilities.