I've been receiving an unusual number of calls from parents reporting that their children are being bullied at school because of their disabilities. They asked about the applicable laws, who could be sued, the standard of proof, etc. I told them the basic information about this is detailed, so I'd put it in a blog article this week. Here goes . . .
Claims alleging that a school district is liable for harassment of a student on the basis of disability may be filed under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) (Iowa Code ch. 216). They may also be filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.). These statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities, including public schools, and provide for private rights of action. Remedies under these statutes are informed by the standards developed in analogous discrimination contexts, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), which addresses sex-based discrimination and harassment in educational settings.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act & Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
The principal federal statutes governing disability-based harassment in public schools are Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.). Both statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities, including public schools, and provide for private rights of action. Remedies under these statutes are informed by the standards developed in analogous discrimination contexts, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), which addresses sex-based discrimination and harassment in educational settings.
Applicable Standards
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2025 decision in A.J.T. ex rel A.T. v. Osseo Area Schs., made it clear that the Eighth Circuit's prior requirement of bad faith or gross misjudgment is no longer good law. Instead, the ordinary standards for disability discrimination apply, and deliberate indifference is sufficient to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of compensatory damages. A.J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Osseo Area Schs., 605 US _ (2025).
It's important to note that the deliberate indifference standard still requires a showing that the school's response to known acts of disability-based harassment was clearly unreasonable. Not every inadequate or unsuccessful response will rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The harassment must also be sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to deprive the victim of access to educational opportunities or benefits. Estate of Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d 998, 1006 (8th Cir. 2018).
To prevail on a disability-based harassment claim under the ADA or Section 504, in the Eighth Circuit, a plaintiff must establish:
• The plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability.
• The plaintiff was subjected to harassment based on disability.
• The school had actual knowledge of the harassment.
• The school was deliberately indifferent to the known harassment.
• The harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived the student of access to educational opportunities or benefits.
These elements are drawn from the deliberate indifference framework and supported by both Title IX and disability discrimination case law. Jane Doe v. Dardanelle Sch. Dist., 928 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2019); S.S. v. Raytown Quality Sch. Dist., 21-00207-CV-W-WBG (W.D. Mo. Aug 11, 2021); A.J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Osseo Area Schs., 605 US _ (2025).
No Administrative Exhaustion Requirement
Neither Section 504 nor the ADA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies; aggrieved individuals may file suit directly in court.
Causation
To demonstrate that the harassment was disability-based, plaintiffs must show that the harassing conduct was directed at the student because of their disability. This requires evidence that the harassers targeted the student due to their disability, rather than for unrelated reasons. Such evidence may include statements, conduct, or circumstances indicating that the disability was the reason for the harassment.
Remedies
The secondary material in Osseo Area Schools Decided (2025) further clarifies that deliberate indifference is sufficient to establish intentional discrimination for compensatory damages, and does not require proof of personal animus or ill will. Punitive damages are not available under any title of the ADA. Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 2011)
Liability
The ADA and Section 504 don’t provide for liability against individual school employees; only the public entity may be held liable. Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2001),
Attorney Fees
Attorney fees are available to prevailing parties under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are discretionary, and courts may consider various factors in determining whether to grant fees and in what amount.
The Iowa Civil Rights Act
The Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) (Iowa Code ch. 216) expressly prohibits educational institutions, including public school districts, from discriminating against students on the basis of disability in any program or activity. It defines “educational institution” broadly to include elementary and secondary schools and their governing boards.
Essential Elements for a Disability Discrimination Claim in the Educational Context
The Iowa Supreme Court set out three essential elements for a disability discrimination claim under the ICRA in the educational context (Palmer Coll. of Chiropractic v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm'n, 850 N.W.2d 326 (Iowa 2014) and Slaughter v. Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2019)):
2. The plaintiff is qualified to participate in the program, meaning they meet the essential eligibility requirements with or without reasonable accommodation.
3. The plaintiff was denied the benefits of, or access to, the program because of their disability.
These elements are consistent with federal ADA and Section 504 disability-based harassment claim standards, which Iowa courts have adopted for ICRA analysis:
2. The plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability.
3. The plaintiff was subjected to harassment based on disability.
4. The school had actual knowledge of the harassment.
5. The school was deliberately indifferent to the known harassment.
6. The harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived the student of access to educational opportunities or benefits.
Administrative Exhaustion Required
The ICRA requires aggrieved individuals to first file a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) and exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing a civil action in court; failure to do so may bar relief under Iowa law. Judicial review of agency actions is governed by Iowa Code § 216.17, with a strict 30-day deadline for seeking review of no-probable-cause decisions.
Causation
The plaintiff must show that the harassing conduct was directed at the student because of their disability. This requires evidence that the harassers targeted the student due to their disability, rather than for unrelated reasons. Such evidence may include statements, conduct, or circumstances indicating that the disability was the reason for the harassment.
Remedies
Remedies available under the ICRA include actual damages, emotional distress damages, reinstatement, and attorney fees, but not punitive damages. See Iowa Code § 216.15; Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School, 187 F.Supp.2d 1099 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
Individual and Entity Liability
Individual supervisor liability is recognized under the ICRA, allowing claims against both the district and responsible administrators or supervisors, particularly under the aiding and abetting and retaliation provisions. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999). However, non-supervisory employees without decision-making authority are generally not liable. Valdez v. W. Des Moines Cmty. Sch., 992 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 2023).
Attorney Fees
The ICRA authorizes the award of reasonable attorney fees to prevailing complainants. Iowa Code § 216.15 explicitly includes reasonable attorney fees as part of the damages that may be awarded to a complainant who prevails after a hearing. This provision is not limited to any particular type of discrimination claim and applies broadly to all forms of discrimination covered by the ICRA. When a complainant receives a right-to-sue letter and brings an action in district court under Iowa Code § 216.16, the court is empowered to grant any relief authorized by § 216.15(9), including attorney fees. The only express limitation on fee awards to respondents is that such fees may be awarded only if the court finds the complainant’s action was frivolous. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the statutory language of the ICRA requires the award of reasonable attorney fees to any plaintiff who obtains a judgment under the Act, emphasizing the mandatory nature of attorneys. Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 2022).
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