Last week, I had an unusual number of calls from parents of students with disabilities who told me that their children were being harassed "on the basis of sex." They asked about the applicable laws, who could be sued, the standard of proof, etc.
I explained that even the general information I'd provide would be detailed, so I'd put it in a blog article this week. Here goes . . .
Claims by parents or guardians alleging that a school district is liable for harassment of a student on the basis of sex may be filed under either the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) (Iowa Code ch. 216) or Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2018)). Both the ICRA and Title IX prohibit sex-based discrimination and harassment in educational settings, including public schools, but have differences as explained below.
The Iowa Civil Rights Act
The Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) (Iowa Code ch. 216) is Iowa’s exclusive statute for state civil rights claims of discrimination or harassment in education. It expressly prohibits educational institutions, including public school districts, from discriminating against students on the basis of sex or sexual orientation in any program or activity. It defines “educational institution” broadly to include elementary and secondary schools and their governing boards.
Administrative Exhaustion. The ICRA requires aggrieved individuals to first file a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) and exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing a civil action in court; failure to do so may bar relief under Iowa law. Judicial review of agency actions is governed by Iowa Code § 216.17, with a strict 30-day deadline for seeking review of no-probable-cause decisions.
“Based on Sex.” The ICRA explicitly includes sex and sexual orientation as protected classes. Iowa courts interpret the phrase “based on sex” under the ICRA to prohibit discrimination that would not have occurred but for the individual’s biological sex, as observed at birth, but not discrimination based on gender identity. The 2025 legislative amendments in Iowa Code § 4.1A codify this approach, defining “sex” as biological and excluding gender identity, gender expression, and related concepts from its scope. This statutory construction rule now governs all Iowa statutes, including the ICRA, unless a specific statute states otherwise.
Causation Standard. A claim for student-on-student harassment requires proof that the harassment was motivated by the victim’s sex or failure to conform to gender stereotypes. It must be a “motivating factor” in the adverse action, meaning it played a part in the decision, even if it wasn’t the sole reason. Iowa Civil Jury Instructions 3130.2; Wolfe v. Fayetteville (648 F.3d 860, 271 Ed. Law Rep. 41 (8th Cir. 2011); Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2009).
Remedies. Remedies available under the ICRA include actual damages, emotional distress damages, reinstatement, and attorney fees, but not punitive damages. See Iowa Code § 216.15; Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School, 187 F.Supp.2d 1099 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
Individual and Entity Liability. Individual supervisor liability is recognized under the ICRA, allowing claims against both the district and responsible administrators or supervisors, particularly under the aiding and abetting and retaliation provisions. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999). However, non-supervisory employees without decision-making authority are generally not liable. Valdez v. W. Des Moines Cmty. Sch., 992 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 2023).
Attorney Fees. The ICRA authorizes the award of reasonable attorney fees to prevailing complainants. Iowa Code § 216.15 explicitly includes reasonable attorney fees as part of the damages that may be awarded to a complainant who prevails after a hearing. This provision is not limited to any particular type of discrimination claim and applies broadly to all forms of discrimination covered by the ICRA. When a complainant receives a right-to-sue letter and brings an action in district court under Iowa Code § 216.16, the court is empowered to grant any relief authorized by § 216.15(9), which includes attorney fees. The only express limitation on fee awards to respondents is that such fees may be awarded only if the court finds the complainant’s action was frivolous. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the statutory language of the ICRA requires the award of reasonable attorney fees to any plaintiff who obtains a judgment under the Act, emphasizing the mandatory nature of the attorney fee provision. Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 2022).
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2018)), is the federal statute that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
No Administrative Exhaustion Requirement. Title IX provides an implied private right of action for individuals subjected to intentional sex discrimination, including deliberate indifference by a school district to student-on-student harassment. Aggrieved individuals may file suit directly in court.
“On the basis of sex." Title IX’s statutory language prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex” in federally funded educational programs. This no longer includes sexual orientation. In early 2025, a federal district court vacated the 2024 Title IX regulations that had expanded the definition of sex discrimination to include sexual orientation and gender identity, holding that Title IX’s protections are limited to biological sex. Tennessee v. Cardona, 762 F.Supp.3d 615 (E.D. Ky. 2025). Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Education and federally funded institutions reverted to the 2020 Title IX regulations, which do not expressly protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.
Causation. A claim for student-on-student harassment requires proof that the harassment was motivated by the victim’s sex or failure to conform to gender stereotypes. It must be a “motivating factor” in the adverse action, meaning it played a part in the decision, even if it wasn’t the sole reason (Iowa Civil Jury Instructions 3130.2; Wolfe v. Fayetteville (648 F.3d 860, 271 Ed. Law Rep. 41 (8th Cir. 2011); Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2009).
Remedies. The primary remedy available under Title IX is monetary damages against the school district, provided the plaintiff demonstrates that an official with authority had actual knowledge of the harassment and responded in a manner that was clearly unreasonable, resulting in a denial of equal educational access. In addition to damages, courts may also grant equitable remedies such as injunctive relief, requiring the school to take corrective measures to prevent further discrimination or harassment.
Liability. Title IX does not provide for liability against individual school employees; only the funding recipient (the school district) may be held liable.
Attorney Fees. Attorney fees are available to prevailing parties in Title IX actions at the discretion of the court, pursuant to federal statute. The primary legislative authority governing attorney fees in Title IX actions is 42 U.S.C. § 1988, commonly known as the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act. The statute provides that in any action or proceeding to enforce, among other statutes, Title IX of Public Law 92-318 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), the court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party (other than the United States) a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
Elements Required for School District Liability
Under ICRA and Title IX, damages are available only if the plaintiff can establish all the following elements:
1. Substantial Control: The school district had substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurs. This usually means that the harassment takes place during school hours, on school property, or at school-sponsored events, and that the harasser is a student subject to the school’s disciplinary authority.
2. Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive Harassment: The harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, requiring conduct that creates a hostile environment and significantly interferes with the victim’s ability to participate in or benefit from the school’s programs. The conduct must be offensive to a reasonable person in the victim’s position, and it must actually interfere with the victim’s education. Courts consider the context, including the age of the students, the school environment, and the cumulative effect of the conduct.
3. Actual Knowledge: The school district had actual knowledge of the harassment. This means that an official of the district, who has the authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures, is aware of the harassment. In peer-on-peer cases, the courts don't require that the knowledge be held by a specific “appropriate person,” but the district as an entity must have actual notice. Constructive knowledge (i.e., the district should have known) is not sufficient for liability under Title IX in the Eighth Circuit; actual knowledge is required.
4. Deliberate Indifference: The school district’s response (or lack of response) to the known harassment amounted to deliberate indifference, meaning that it was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. A response that is merely negligent, ineffective, or not optimal doesn’t meet this threshold. The school is not required to remedy the harassment completely, but it must take steps that are reasonably calculated to end the harassment, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects.
Examples of “Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive” Conduct
Repeated, Unwelcome Sexual Touching and Explicit Language. In Bruning v. Carroll Community School Dist., 486 F.Supp.2d 892 (N.D. Iowa 2007), the Northern District found that months-long harassment involving frequent, unwelcome sexual groping and explicit, vulgar language was sufficiently severe and pervasive. The court compared this to other cases where physical assaults, attempts to disrobe a student, and similar acts were found to meet the threshold. The key factors were the frequency, duration, and physical invasiveness of the conduct, as well as its impact on the victim’s sense of safety and ability to participate in school.
Widespread, Hate-Based Harassment and Threats. In Doe v. Perry Community School Dist. (316 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D. Iowa 2004)), the plaintiff alleged that he was perceived as homosexual, and as a result, for over three years, was subjected to severe verbal and physical harassment, demeaning behavior and treatment, and suffered physical and emotional damage arising from a hostile environment of hate-based discrimination and harassment, including physical assaults, threats of violence, and demeaning treatment by both students and staff, all based on perceived sexual orientation. The harassment was not limited to a few incidents but involved dozens or even hundreds of acts by at least forty students, as well as discriminatory conduct by teachers and administrators. The result was a hostile environment so pervasive and intimidating that the student missed significant class time, suffered declining grades, quit extracurricular activities, and ultimately left in-person schooling. The court found these allegations sufficient to state a claim under the Davis standard, emphasizing the cumulative effect of frequent, hate-based, and physically threatening conduct.
Physical Assaults and Intimidation. The courts have also recognized that physical assaults, threats, and intimidation, especially when repeated or accompanied by other forms of harassment, can meet the severe and pervasive threshold. For example, in Bruning, the court referenced a case where a student was stabbed in the hand with a pen, held down while others tried to remove her clothing, and subjected to other physically invasive acts. Such conduct, particularly when it occurs more than once or is part of a pattern, is likely to be deemed objectively offensive and to interfere with educational access.
Substantial Educational Harm. Courts look for evidence that the student’s ability to participate in or benefit from school programs has been significantly impaired. This can include:
•
Missing classes or school days to avoid harassment
•
Declining academic performance or grades
• Withdrawal from extracurricular activities
• Emotional or physical harm affecting school participation
• Leaving the school or switching to homeschooling
Courts have consistently held that certain types of conduct, even if offensive or sex-based, don’t meet the Davis standard:
• Teasing, name-calling, or insults: Common schoolyard behavior, even if it involves offensive language or targets gender, is not enough. See e.g., Estate of Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2018); Wolfe v. Fayetteville, 648 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011).
• Isolated incidents: A single exposure to an offensive act, such as viewing a distasteful videotape, is generally insufficient unless it is extremely egregious. See e.g., Lam v. Curators of the University of Missouri at Kansas City Dental School, 122 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1997); K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017)).
• Conduct not based on protected status: Harassment must be motivated by sex or another protected characteristic to be actionable under Title IX; mere offensive conduct without discriminatory intent doesn’t qualify. Wolfe v. Fayetteville, 648 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011).
• Objective and Subjective Components: The standard is both objective and subjective. The conduct must be offensive to a reasonable person in the victim’s position (objective), and it must actually interfere with the victim’s education (subjective). Courts consider the context, including the age of the students, the school environment, and the cumulative effect of the conduct. See e.g., Wolfe v. Fayetteville, 648 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011); Bruning v. Carroll Community School Dist., 486 F.Supp.2d 892 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
Conclusion
The standard for holding a public school district liable for peer-on-peer bullying and harassment on the basis of sex under Iowa law is governed by the federal Title IX framework. A district is liable only if it has actual knowledge of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment that denies the victim access to educational opportunities, and responds with deliberate indifference-that is, its response is clearly unreasonable in light of the circumstances. This is a demanding standard, requiring more than negligence or ineffective action, and is the controlling rule for Iowa public school districts in the absence of any separate state-law standard. The key elements are substantial control, severityx, and pervasiveness of the harassment, actual knowledge, and deliberate indifference by the district.
Selected Cases
Fogle v. Clay Elementary Sch.-SE. Polk Cmty. Sch. Dist., 24-1351 (Iowa Nov 14, 2025). The Iowa Supreme Court stated that the ICRA is the exclusive procedural avenue for state-law civil rights claims under Iowa Code chapter 216 and that it expressly covers educational institutions, including public schools, for discrimination/harassment in education. It doesn’t say that Title IX is unavailable; rather, it clarifies that if proceeding under the ICRA, one must exhaust the ICRA’s administrative procedures.
Mungai v. Univ. of Minn., 24-1894 (8th Cir. Jun 26, 2025). The Eighth Circuit restated, “The harassment must be so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it deprives the victim of ‘access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.’” For the University to incur liability under Title VI, it must be “(1) deliberately indifferent (2) to known acts of harassment (3) that occurred at a location and by an individual under its control. . . . The harassment must be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives the victim of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”
Parents Defending Educ. v. Linn Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 83 F.4th 658 (8th Cir. 2023). The Eighth Circuit recognized that both Title IX and the ICRA impose duties on Iowa school districts to protect students from sex-based harassment and discrimination. The court noted that both Title IX and the ICRA prohibit sex-based discrimination in public schools and that deliberate indifference to such harassment violates federal law. The opinion treated the statutes as parallel sources of legal duty, suggesting that claims may be brought under either or both statutes, subject to their respective procedural requirements.
Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 2022). The Iowa Supreme Court held that the legislature, by adding “gender identity” as a separate protected class, had ratified the narrow, biological understanding of “sex.” The Court explicitly distinguished “sex” from “gender identity,” holding that discrimination based on transgender status is not covered by the “sex” category but by the “gender identity” category, if at all.
Gullion ex rel. A.M. v. Manson NW. Webster Sch. Dist., No. 19-CV-3015-CJW-MAR (N.D. Iowa Jan 27, 2021). The court analyzed the claim under federal law. Although the deliberate indifference framework is most commonly associated with Title IX, it also applies to ICRA claims, as recognized in Bruning.
Du Bois v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 987 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2021). The Eighth Circuit applied the deliberate indifference standard of Title IX to the student-on-student sexual harassment claim.
Estate of Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2018). The Eighth Circuit found there was no evidence that the degree of the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”“It is not enough to show ... that a student has been teased ... or called offensive names. . . . schools are unlike the adult workplace and that children may regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults . . . students often engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing . . . Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children . . .”
K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College, 865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017). The Eighth Circuit again confirmed the Eighth Circuit’s adherence to the Davis standard. The court provided that the theory of student-on-student harassment liability under Title IX was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Davis and that the Eighth Circuit’s standard, as stated in Ostrander, is derived from Davis: actionable harassment must be severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, effectively denying access to educational opportunities. The court noted that while a single incident could theoretically suffice. K.T., a sixteen-year-old high school junior, was invited to visit Culver-Stockton College as a potential recruit for the women’s soccer team. While visiting, she attended a party at an on-campus fraternity house where she was allegedly served alcohol. K.T. alleged that she was physically and sexually assaulted by a fraternity member who was a student at Culver-Stockton College. She reported the assault to Culver-Stockton one to two days later. K.T. alleged that Culver-Stockton was deliberately indifferent by failing to adopt practices to prevent sexual assault and also failing to investigate and offer medical services to K.T. after she reported the alleged incident. The College allegedly canceled a scheduled conference with K.T. and her parents in response to the report.
Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2014). The Eighth Circuit applied the Davis-Gebser framework, citing Ostrander and Shrum as the circuit’s controlling authorities. The court reiterated that to establish Title IX liability under a deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff must show that the institution was deliberately indifferent to known acts of discrimination occurring under its control.
Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 866 (8th Cir. 2011). A Title IX claim for student-on-student harassment requires proof that the harassment was motivated by the victim’s sex or failure to conform to gender stereotypes. The Eighth Circuit found in favor of the school district that claimed the motive for the misconduct was not sex-based because Wolfe’s fellow students and teachers did not perceive Wolfe as homosexual, and they believed he conformed to typical male gender stereotypes. His classmates said the homosexual name-calling wasn’t intended to attack Wolfe’s sexuality, but rather was an angry response to Wolfe’s mistreatment of other students. The Eighth Circuit denied Wolfe’s motion for a new trial, saying, among other things, that he failed to point to any legal authority holding that the mere use of sex-based language in rumors or name-calling was sufficient to establish sex-based discrimination and that there must be evidence of discriminatory intent. (The student was subjected to frequent harassment by fellow students, including physical assaults, name-calling with gender-based epithets (such as “faggot,” “queer bait,” and “homo”), and the creation of a Facebook group targeting him with homophobic imagery and language. Graffiti with offensive, sexually charged accusations about Wolfe appeared in school bathrooms and textbooks. The harassment escalated over the years, culminating in a physical assault during his tenth-grade year. Wolfe and his family reported these incidents to the school, but the school did not refer them to its Title IX Coordinator or Equity Compliance Officer, treating them as bullying rather than sexual harassment. The school responded by investigating incidents, removing graffiti, and reviewing bullying policies, but Wolfe was dissatisfied with these measures. After a particularly violent incident and subsequent media attention, Wolfe left the school and pursued a GED.).
Bruning v. Carroll Community School Dist., 486 F.Supp.2d 892 (N.D. Iowa 2007). The court held that claims of student-on-student sexual harassment under the ICRA should be analyzed under the Davis standard. It identified conduct that satisfied the Davis standard: months-long, frequent harassment including sexually explicit vulgar language and repeated unwelcome sexual groping, comparable to incidents involving physical assault and attempts to disrobe, and clarifies that mere teasing and name-calling are insufficient. The court allowed both Title IX and ICRA claims to proceed on the same factual basis, indicating that plaintiffs may pursue both avenues concurrently and that Iowa courts are likely to apply the Title IX standard to ICRA education claims.
Cox v. Sugg, 484 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit held that Title IX provides a cause of action against federally-funded educational institutions for deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment and bars individual-capacity suits under Title IX or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on Title IX violations. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the administrators’ actions caused the injuries they alleged. Because § 1983 damage liability requires a direct causal link between the unconstitutional action and the injury, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. This case reinforces the principle that for § 1983 damage claims, plaintiffs must demonstrate a direct causal link between each defendant’s unconstitutional action and the plaintiff’s injury. The court’s decision affirmed the grant of summary judgment on these grounds.
Doe v. Perry Community School Dist., 316 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D. Iowa 2004). The court applied the Davis standard to allegations of multi-year, frequent, hate-based verbal and physical harassment, threats, assaults, wide participation by students and involvement by staff, resulting in fear, missed classes, declining grades, quitting extracurriculars, and leaving in-person schooling. These facts demonstrate conduct deemed sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to interfere with educational access under Title IX.
Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the standard articulated in Shrum, again referencing Davis and emphasizing the deliberate indifference and control elements. Ostrander cited Shrum as the source of the Eighth Circuit’s adoption of the Davis standard.
Schultzen v. Woodbury Central Community School, 187 F.Supp.2d 1099 (N.D. Iowa 2002). The plaintiffs pleaded both Title IX and ICRA claims against a school district for sex-based discrimination and harassment. The court held that deliberate indifference to harassment fits within Title IX’s private right of action with the Gebser-Davis standard (actual notice and deliberate indifference). It didn’t decide that such claims must be brought under one statute instead of the other; rather, it permitted both to be pled, while limiting punitive damages (unavailable against the district under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the ICRA).
Shrum v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit cited and applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Davis standard, holding that for a school district to incur liability under Title IX, it must be deliberately indifferent to known acts of discrimination that occur under its control, and it must exercise substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurs, as required by Davis. This was the first case in which the Eighth Circuit adopted the Davis framework for peer-on-peer harassment claims.
Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999). The Eighth Circuit stated that a necessary element of a claim under Title IX for hostile workplace environment sexual harassment requires conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter educational conditions and create an abusive environment. The court found that a single exposure to an offensive videotape doesn’t meet that threshold, indicating that isolated incidents of mere offensiveness typically are insufficient. This informs what doesn’t qualify and implies that more extensive, repeated, or more egregious conduct (e.g., coercive sexual contact referenced in cited cases) would be required.
Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 171 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff in a Title IX case may not recover against a school district without first showing that a district official with the authority to address the complained-of conduct and take corrective action had actual notice of the harassing behavior and failed adequately to respond.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). The USSC examined whether the prohibition of “discrimination because of sex” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, extended to same-sex sexual harassment. The Court held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, dismissing the rule that discrimination claims are barred where both plaintiff and defendant are of the same sex. It requiref that any harassment is deemed objectively offensive and creates a hostile or abusive work environment from the reasonable person’s perspective in the plaintiff’s position, considering all circumstances.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). The USSC established that for a school district to be liable in damages under Title IX for teacher-student sexual harassment, an official with authority to take corrective action must have actual notice of the misconduct and respond with deliberate indifference. The decision rejected vicarious liability and constructive notice as bases for damages, emphasizing the need for actual knowledge and a culpable response by the institution itself.
Kinman v. Omaha Public School Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit confirmed that Title IX provides a private damages action for intentional sex discrimination in educational programs and that courts apply Title VII standards to institutional liability in student harassment contexts. It addresses federal Title IX as the vehicle for claims of deliberate indifference by a school district to sexual harassment.
Wright v. Mason City Community School Dist., 940 F.Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996). The court found that the test articulated in Burrow is the appropriate test for an actionable claim of peer sexual harassment under Title IX. A plaintiff must prove (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of the plaintiff’s education and created an abusive educational environment; and (5) that the educational institution knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take the proper remedial measures because of the plaintiff’s sex.
Burrow By and Through Burrow v. Postville Comm., 929 F.Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996). This case is significant because the court recognized that a student could pursue a Title IX claim against a school district for failing to respond to peer sexual harassment, and clarified that intent to discriminate can be inferred from inaction despite actual knowledge. The court adopted a slightly modified version of the Davis elements: “(1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s education and create an abusive educational environment; and (5) that the educational institution knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial measures because of the plaintiff’s sex.”
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Com’n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). The Iowa Supreme Court held that “sex” under the ICRA did not include transgender status or transsexuality, limiting the term to its binary meaning. This interpretation was reaffirmed in Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 2022), where the Iowa Supreme Court held that the legislature, by adding “gender identity” as a separate protected class, had ratified the narrow, biological understanding of “sex.” The Court explicitly distinguished “sex” from “gender,” holding that discrimination based on transgender status is not covered by the “sex” category but by the “gender identity” category, if at all.
